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How to Damage an Already Fragile Economy 
The Rise and Fall of Populism in Greece 
 
After years of high growth driven by debt-fueled consumption1, Greece 
suffered a catastrophic loss of investor confidence beginning in late 2009. This led 
the Greek government to lose market access in the spring of 2010 and to apply for a 
bailout from its partners in the Eurozone and the International Monetary Fund. The 
initial bailout program, based on overly optimistic projections about the public 
sector’s capacity to reform and the resilience of the economy in the face of a major 
contraction of domestic demand, collapsed within months.  The second program, 
which included a deep restructuring of the country’s debt, also failed to resolve the 
issue of debt sustainability and structural weakness, and involved fiscal targets that 
– though not as demanding as those of its predecessor – were widely disparaged as 
inconsistent with a robust recovery.  
In this context SYRIZA, a leftist party committed to the rejection of austerity 
and of the logic of the bailouts, was catapulted into power in January 2015. SYRIZA 
allied itself with the Independent Greeks (ANEL, for short), a nationalist right-wing 
party founded in 2012 by a former deputy of the center-right New Democracy who 
vehemently opposed the decision by party leader Antonis Samaras to embrace the 
country’s second bailout.  
In the paper below, we attempt to explain the Greek brand of crisis populism 
and to give an account of its turbulent record in office so far. We also give an 
account of the economic conditions that allowed this unexpected coalition to take 
power. Finally, we offer a policy prescription to tackle the flawed aspects of the 
bailout programs, focusing on freeing up markets and strengthening Greece’s weak 
institutions. 
1. The Rise of Crisis Populism 
SYRIZA had been a minor force at the margins of Greek parliamentary politics 
before the crisis. It was led since February 2008 by Alexis Tsipras, an activist and 
politician since his student days with little experience of the world beyond the 
narrow universe of the Greek Marxist left. In the October 2009 parliamentary 
elections, the last before the outbreak of the crisis, SYRIZA got 4.6% of the vote. The 
winners, the centre-left PASOK, got 43.9%. 
However, the deep economic shock which began in 2009 led to major 
political disruption. SYRIZA’s electoral lift-off, and the parallel collapse of PASOK, 
was fueled by the public’s rage at an ever-deepening recession and the humiliation 
of externally-imposed austerity. SYRIZA, along with other parties of the populist left 
and right, including future coalition partners ANEL, tapped both these elements of 
popular disaffection. It insisted that it was the country’s official creditors that were 
to blame for Greece’s economic collapse, not the fiscal derailment of the years 
before 2010. It spoke of a “humanitarian crisis” caused by the measures imposed by 
the “troika” of the EU, the ECB and the IMF, and portrayed the governments that 
had signed and implemented the two first bailout agreements as Quisling 
administrations, subservient to the will of foreign masters.  
The severity of the crimes imputed by SYRIZA upon the governing parties led 
its members to actively participate in violent demonstrations against government 
policy, campaigns of civil disobedience against unpopular legislation, and 
occupations of public buildings. When mobs waylaid government ministers and MPs, 
SYRIZA stalwarts justified the practice, speaking of socially justified violence. 
The core message of SYRIZA’s nationalist populism, echoing the campaign by 
Andreas Papandreou that led to the first electoral triumph of PASOK in 1981, was 
that the party was the true representative of the Greek people against the 
machinations and institutions of domestic and foreign elites. Therefore, its 
ascension to power would mean that Greece would regain economic sovereignty 
and policy would again represent the interests of the many, not the few.  
This brand of crisis populism fed on a set of myths, grounding the belief that 
Greece had a number of options available to escape the troika, if only it elected a 
government willing to explore them. At the same time, and despite all this, Tsipras 
and other top SYRIZA cadres maintained that their wholesale rejection of the bailout 
programs would not endanger the country’s position in the Eurozone. The depth of 
the crisis and the appeal of Tsipras and his nationalist-populist narrative propelled 
SYRIZA into the mainstream. After twin elections in May and June 2012, the party 
(still at the time a loose coalition of far-left groupings) became Greece’s official 
opposition, its share of the vote rising to 26.9%.  
Entry into the ante-chamber of power did little to dampen SYRIZA’s radical 
rhetoric. As the New Democracy-led government struggled to extract concessions 
from Greece’s official creditors and to drag the economy towards recovery, SYRIZA 
kept up the pressure, promising to overturn privatization deals and prosecute those 
who signed off on them, pledging to get rid of a hated new property tax and to 
increase the minimum wage and pensions for the least well-off. Seen widely as 
prime-minister-in-waiting after SYRIZA’s victory in the European elections in May 
2014, Tsipras continued hammering away at the central idea: that the source of all 
of Greece’s ills was the bailout regime, and that he would dismantle it as soon as he 
came to power. 
SYRIZA was a key factor in the early demise of Greece’s recovery in 2014. To 
be sure, the unwillingness of Angela Merkel to fulfill promises of further debt relief, 
offered to Greece by its Eurozone partners in November 2012 on the condition of 
achieving a primary surplus and implementing the terms of the second bailout, 
weakened the ND-led government.  Meanwhile the IMF was unheeded in its calls for 
further debt restructuring and deeply suspicious of the government’s commitment 
to reform. Consequently, it insisted on ever more demanding shows of compliance 
from Athens.  
But SYRIZA’s growing electoral clout, and, by 2015, the looming 
parliamentary vote for the election of a new president of the Republic, contributed 
to impasse. Electing a new president required a 3/5 majority in the 300-seat 
parliament. Failure to reach 180 MPs meant a dissolution of parliament and fresh 
elections, and Tsipras made it clear that no matter which candidate the government 
put forth he would withhold support. Key figures among the creditors knew conflict 
with a SYRIZA-led government was inevitable, and were loath to offer Tsipras the 
advantage of a completed bailout program and more than 7 billion euros in bailout 
funds.2  In the end, the final review of the second bailout was never completed and 
early elections were called. 
2. Populism in power 
On the night of his electoral triumph on January 25, 2015 Tsipras said: 
“Greece is leaving behind destructive austerity, fear and authoritarianism…The 
verdict of the Greek people renders the troika a thing of the past for our common 
European framework.” 
This proved to be a premature verdict. But it took the young, inexperienced 
prime minister a long time to realize that fact. In the meantime, political risk 
reached new heights, taking Greece closer to exiting the euro than ever before. The 
story of the long and frustrating renegotiation of the bailout terms between January 
and July is complicated, and creditors bear a large share of the blame for failure to 
reach a timely, mutually beneficial agreement. But for the purposes of this paper, 
we will focus on the role of the populist Greek government, a coalition between 
SYRIZA and ANEL, in the terrible outcome.  
The SYRIZA-ANEL coalition, in what on the surface seemed a surprising 
alliance between the hard left and the nationalist right, was forged overnight and 
lacked a detailed common policy platform. The two parties came together on the 
basis of shared abhorrence of the bailout regime imposed on Greece. 
The alliance has proved unexpectedly durable, however, even after both 
parties succumbed to the inevitability of another bailout for Greece in July 2015. 
The glue that has held them together has been clientelism. The number of political 
appointments has reached record highs under the SYRIZA-ANEL government. The 
two parties have done their utmost to get as many loyalists as possible into 
government jobs. Party membership or ties of friendship with Tsipras and other 
high-ranking figures, instead of merit, have often been the decisive criterion for 
appointments, even for strategic positions in the prime minister’s office.  
In its first six months, the coalition held to its populist-nationalist roots, 
exploring a number of alternative sources of lending and basic imports (from Russia 
and China to Venezuela and Iran), and even looking into the possibility of printing a 
new currency.3 These efforts all came to naught, forcing Tsipras to give in and sign a 
third bailout – another 86 billion euros in loans from Greece’s creditors, in exchange 
for new austerity measures and structural reforms.  
Part of the reason why the negotiation lasted so long and ended so badly for 
Greece is that the populist-nationalist strain in the government’s approach 
prevented a realistic assessment of the situation. Instead, it led to a ceaseless search 
for enemies external and internal which were undermining the self-styled 
“government of national salvation”. The effect of this was to create a bunker 
mentality, a sense that the government was encircled by enemy forces seeking its 
destruction. This prevented necessary changes in policy and personnel (they were 
viewed as a form of capitulation to the creditors) and sharpened the authoritarian 
instincts of the leadership team. 
The quest for enemies within also deepened the division in society that the 
forces of populism had already fostered before January 2015. Government ministers 
routinely attacked critical voices in parliament, the media and on the streets as, at 
best, dupes of the oligarchy or, at worst, members of a wide-ranging conspiracy to 
defeat the coalition and restore the old order.4  
3. “Everything is a coup”  
Even in the aftermath of the July 2015 surrender and later Tsipras’s 
reelection as prime minister in September 2015, the bunker mentality and the 
divisive rhetoric pitting “the people” against the oligarchic special interests 
continued to dominate SYRIZA-ANEL communications strategy. The prime minister 
and his people blamed the intransigent creditors and their supposed allies in media 
and domestic politics for the poor outcome of the negotiation. Top ministers even 
spoke of a “coup” against Greece perpetrated by its European partners5. The 
inability to admit strategic error and the tendency to accuse others for its own 
disasters has been SYRIZA-ANEL’s central flaw. 
The case of the TV licenses auction illustrates this well. The need for a new, 
stricter regulatory framework for Greek television was clear, and the issue should 
have benefitted the government politically. But it soon became evident that, in 
setting up an auction process to award national TV licenses, the government’s goal 
was to avoid breaking up the so-called “triangle of corruption” between media 
oligarchs, politicians and banks, but to create a new triangle, made up of networks 
and businessmen friendlier to the SYRIZA-ANEL government. The clumsy attempt to 
usurp the authority of a constitutionally mandated independent body to regulate 
the sector, and to restrict the number of licenses to four, was struck down in 
October 2016 by the Council of State, Greece’s top administrative court.  The initial 
response of the government was to lash out at the court, with one deputy minister 
speaking of a “judicial coup”. 
The SYRIZA-ANEL alliance has also displayed a pronounced authoritarian 
streak. The populist coalition attacked telecoms and energy regulators and referred 
to the independent tax administration chief as an organ of the creditors (firing her 
with questionable legality in October 2015).6  They have reserved special resources 
to undermining the governor of the Bank of Greece, Yannis Stournaras (who also 
served as finance minister between 2012-4 under the ND-led government).7 In these 
and other cases, critics have pointed out a worrisome tendency of government 
interference in the justice system. 
4. Policy context and implications 
Greece’s crisis was mishandled from the start. The Greek economy was 
burdened by reluctant promotion of much-needed reforms that would remove 
supply-side bottlenecks to growth. The official creditors pushed for a large “internal 
devaluation”. Yet they allowed the domestic political system to force the cost of this 
adjustment mainly onto the private sector, where it was less necessary8, and to 
protect the public sector, which was in most urgent need of radical restructuring. 
This misguided application of internal devaluation wreaked havoc on the economy, 
the labor market and society at large, leading to political turbulence.9 
The “troika”  initially sanctioned a policy mix that focused on increasing taxes 
for the private sector and labor market reforms, while postponing privatization and 
deep structural reforms in the public administration. Excessive regulation and 
barriers to entry in key sectors remained in place, as successive governments failed 
to implement legislation to free up the economy. Meanwhile, high energy prices and 
the drying up of bank credit created impossible conditions even for well-run, export-
driven businesses. The tax hikes and spending cuts, along with the steep drop of 
private sector wages and the explosive rise in the number of the unemployed, led to 
a collapse of domestic demand. In an economy so dependent on consumption, this 
meant that the recession was much deeper and longer than predicted. 
Figure 1 shows how employment declined due to this process, with political 
instability and the lack of reform progress placing a cumulative burden on the 
private sector. This figure also shows how critical the cost of funding in the private 
sector is for economic recovery, depicting the positive correlation between high 
interest rates and the uncertainty they reflect.10 
Figure 1. Political risk and economic performance 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from Elstat data on employment and inflation at constant 
taxes, Ministry of Interior election results, ECB on interest rates for non-financial 
corporations.  
 
The Greek case shows that political risk is greater when political uncertainty 
is high, institutions of governance are malfunctioning and economic conditions are 
weak. The vicious cycle of bad economic conditions and high political risk has 
stymied Greek recovery and spread political extremism and business uncertainty. 
What is worse, the disease is contagious: As Kelly, Pastor and Veronesi (2014)11 
point-out, shortly before key Greek elections one could find a very high price of 
political uncertainty across all European countries. Today, with populist forces on 
the rise throughout Europe, it is important to take a closer look at this phenomenon. 
The typical reaction to crises is a significant increase in support for far-right 
parties, the truncation of governmental majorities and the fragmentation of 
parliaments, as more parties gain representation12. These developments tend to 
hinder crisis resolution and contribute to political gridlock. This hurts growth, 
incomes, asset prices and employment in the short- and long-term, fostering more 
political uncertainty and further diminishing capacity for crisis resolution.  
This model of the weakening of the political center and the fragmentation of 
representation perfectly fits the Greek experience from 2010 onwards (see figure 2). 
Golden Dawn, the neo-fascist party, has seen its share of the vote soar from 0.3% in 
2009 to around 7% in all parliamentary elections from 2012 on (in the European 
election in 2014 it reached as high as 9%). The two largest parties in the current 
parliament, SYRIZA and New Democracy, together take in between 55-65% of the 
vote. In the heyday of the pre-crisis two-party system, PASOK and ND combined for 
more than 80% of voters’ preferences. New parties crop up and immediately gain 
parliamentary representation, often disappearing just as quickly. The last single-
party government fell in November 2011, and the average life-span of governments 
in the last ten years has been no longer than two years. These developments are in 
line with the decline in Greeks’ trust not only in their own political system, but also 
in EU institutions during the crisis. 
Figure 2. Political reactions to extremism in Greece 
 
Source: Greek election results, analysis inspired by Funke, Trebesch, Schularich (2015). LAOS, 
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support Syriza can be credibly questioned, especially after the 2015 referendum and the signing of 
the 3rd assistance program MoU.   
 
The over-ambitious design and lackluster execution of the initial bailout 
program has weakened the political forces that strove for reform and fed the fires of 
populism. The inability of the Eurozone, with its incomplete governance structures 
and the reassertion of nationalist narratives, to deal effectively with a country with 
frayed institutions and a deep-rooted unwillingness to reform, led to the short-
sighted adoption of the “Grexit” threat. This, in turn, amplified the negative trends 
that were already in motion. Europe needs to work out a mechanism to handle crises 
within the euro area in a way that supports “convergence in institutions” among the 
member-states and eliminates the threat of expulsion.13  
5. The hard road ahead 
Economic history does not hold hopeful lessons for Greece. Even if Greeks do 
not become further impoverished, empirical evidence of countries in prolonged 
depressions points to persistent radicalization, populism as the hegemonic 
worldview and weakened institutions. 
Greece today desperarely needs lower taxation and a less crushing regulatory 
and insurance burden on business (a necessary condition of which is further debt 
relief from official creditors). It requires reform of product and service markets, that 
will break down barriers to entry and allow competition and new ideas to flourish. 
More broadly, it is necessary for the country’s rejuvenation that schools and 
universities be given greater autonomy, to allow them to experiment and innovate 
free from the asphyxiating hold of the state.   
Two areas are particularly critical if any reform project is to achieve long-trm 
success. One is public administration, which must become infused with greater 
meritocracy and managerial best practices, to put an end to clientilistic practices and 
to shake up sclerotic processes and ways of thinking. The second is the 
independence of key institutions, from the regulatory agencies to the courts, which 
has been badly undermined under the current populist coalition.  
 
Only the emergence of a reform-oriented political entity that receives broad 
public support for this agenda will lead Greece out of this situation. Unlikely as this 
may appear, it is not impossible: a party with a liberal platform of reforms and fiscal 
consolidation won close to 50% of the votes in 1990, a time with somewhat similar 
political and economic circumstances. Today, New Democracy, the official 
opposition, is led by Kyriakos Misotakis, the son of the man who led that 
government. Mitsotakis is a keen supporter of the policies outlined above. It remains 
a question, however, how far his reform priorities are shared by his party.  
As insightful students of Greek history have highlighted14, modern Greece has 
a long record of being on the front-line of historical developments – from the 
nationalist self-determination revolutions of the 19th century to the Cold War, and 
from the democratization wave of the 1970s to the outbreak of the sovereign debt 
crisis and the rise of populism as a governing force in western politics.  
The experience of 2015-6 has been traumatic, but also instructive: the snake-
oil promises of the populists were put to the test, and were shown to be based on 
myths, lies and miscalculations, with terrible consequences for the country. That 
lesson learned, Greek voters are increasingly likely to vote the populists out in the 
next election. In much bigger countries that have more recently fallen to the forces 
of anti-globalization, inwardness and post-truth politics, supporters of liberal 
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